Abstract Recent work on cognitive control has suggested a variety of performance monitoring functions of the anterior cingulate cortex such as errors, conXict, error likelihood, and others. Given the variety of monitoring eVects, a corresponding variety of control eVects on behavior might be expected. This paper explores whether conXict and error likelihood produce distinct cognitive control eVects on behavior, as measured by response time. A Change signal task (Brown & Braver, Science 307:1118-1121 , 2005 ) was modiWed to include conditions of likely errors due to tardy as well as premature responses in conditions with and without conXict. The results discriminate between competing hypotheses of independent versus interacting conXict and error likelihood control eVects. SpeciWcally, the results suggest that the likelihood of premature versus tardy response errors can lead to multiple distinct control eVects, which are independent of cognitive control eVects driven by response conXict. As a whole, the results point to the existence of multiple distinct cognitive control mechanisms and challenge existing models of cognitive control that incorporate only a single control signal.
Introduction
Cognitive or executive control (Norman & Shallice, 1986) generally involves two tightly integrated functions: a performance monitoring mechanism that detects the need for control, and a mechanism that subsequently implements control. A number of studies have described a general system in the medial prefrontal cortex that Wrst monitors the outcome of actions (Botvinick, Nystrom, Fissel, Carter, & Cohen, 1999; Brown & Braver, 2005; Carter et al., 1998; Gehring & Knight, 2000; Ito, Stuphorn, Brown, & Schall, 2003; MacDonald, Cohen, Stenger, & Carter, 2000) and then exerts corrective or pre-emptive control signals to optimize goal directed behavior (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001; Brown, Reynolds, & Braver, 2007; Jones, Cho, Nystrom, Cohen, & Braver, 2002) . In the last two decades, a number of diVerent performance monitoring signals have been described: errors (Gemba, Sasaki, & Brooks, 1986; Ito et al., 2003) , correct responses (Ito et al., 2003; Stuphorn, Taylor, & Schall, 2000) , conXict (Botvinick et al., 1999; Carter et al., 1998; MacDonald et al., 2000; Stuphorn et al., 2000) , error likelihood (Brown & Braver, 2005) , expected risk , task switching (Dove, Pollmann, Schubert, Wiggins, & von Cramon, 2000) , and non-stationarity in the environmental contingencies (Behrens, Woolrich, Walton, & Rushworth, 2007) . Given the apparent variety of performance monitoring signals, the next question is whether there is a corresponding variety of control processes. Most models of cognitive control have surprisingly little to say in this regard, as the control signal in a given model generally consists of a scalar value that eVectively either slows responses (Botvinick et al., 2001; Jones et al., 2002) , focuses attention on task relevant rules (Norman & Shallice, 1986; Posner & DiGirolamo, 1998; Reynolds, Braver, Brown, & Stigchel, 2006) or stimuli (Botvinick et al., 2001) , or increases the learning rate (Behrens et al., 2007) . Nonetheless, little is known about the richness and speciWcity of these control signals, and whether or how they may operate concurrently. In previous studies, we have explored whether multiple distinct control signals of response slowing and attentional focusing operate concurrently and interact . This paper further explores the question of multiple concurrent control signals.
The question to be addressed is whether concurrent control mechanisms may not only generally slow responses but also non-speciWcally speed-up speciWc responses depending on the task conditions. In previous literature, the control signals driven by conXict eVects are seen most clearly in that they drive a general slowing of responses in subsequent trials (Botvinick et al., 2001; Jones et al., 2002) or an attentional focusing (Botvinick et al., 2001 ) that slows subsequent performance with diVerent stimuli but speeds subsequent performance with the same stimuli Goschke, 2000) . Studies of error likelihood monitoring have shown weak eVects on response time, in which greater error likelihood increases RT in current trials (Brown & Braver, 2005 . This study examines a variant of the Change signal task (Brown & Braver, 2005 , which manipulates conditions of errors, conXict, and error likelihood to determine whether manipulations of these factors lead to concurrent or interacting control eVects on response time. Our original study of error likelihood (Brown & Braver, 2005 suggested that conXict eVects may reXect error likelihood rather than conXict per se. Subsequent studies showed a surprising inverse relationship between the strength of conXict and error likelihood eVects (Brown & Braver, 2005 , a Wnding that turned out to be predicted by the error likelihood computational model (Brown & Braver, 2008) as originally published (Brown & Braver, 2005) . Of particular interest for the present study is whether the likelihood of diVerent kinds of errors can lead to multiple corresponding control eVects, which are themselves distinct from the control eVects due to conXicts or actual error commission. To investigate this issue, the Change signal task (Brown & Braver, 2005) was modiWed to include separate conditions of error likelihood due to premature versus tardy responses.
The Change signal task (Brown & Braver, 2005) derives from earlier paradigms based on countermanding tasks (Husain, Parton, Hodgson, Mort, & Rees, 2003; Logan & Cowan, 1984) . The purpose of the Change signal task (Fig. 1a) is to distinguish three eVects known to activate anterior cingulate cortex (ACC): response conXict (Botvinick et al., 1999; Carter et al., 1998) , error commission (Gemba et al., 1986; Ito et al., 2003) , and error likelihood (Brown & Braver, 2005 Magno, Foxe, Molholm, Robertson, & Garavan, 2006) . BrieXy, each trial of the Change signal task begins with an arrow pointing either left or right. If the arrow points left, subjects press a left button with the left index Wnger. If the arrow points right, then subjects press a right button with the right index Wnger. In one-third of trials, a second arrow appears, larger than the Wrst arrow and above it, and pointing in the opposite direction. The second arrow instructs the subjects to, if possible, withhold the response to the Wrst arrow and instead generate a response in the direction of the second arrow. The longer the delay between the onset of the Wrst and second arrows becomes (i.e., the Change signal delay or CSD), the more likely the subject reaches the point of return not beyond which an error is inevitable. In this way, the error rate (i.e., error likelihood) can be increased by increasing the CSD. The error rate can be systematically controlled to a speciWc target rate using a stairstep algorithm that adjusts the CSD after each trial (Brown & Braver, 2005) . The color of the arrows is manipulated so that speciWc colors are (Brown & Braver, 2005) . a Subjects must make a button press response with either the left or right index Wnger corresponding to the direction of the last error shown. In the Change condition, a second arrow appears after a delay and instructs the subject to withhold a response to the Wrst arrow and instead respond in the opposite direction based on the second arrow. Visual feedback (Correct, Error, or Faster) is given following the response. Failures to respond before the deadline lead to the feedback signal of "Faster". b In the Low condition, the Change signal delay (CSD) is short, meaning that the second arrow appears quickly after Wrst arrow, and error rates are therefore very Low (around 5%). The response deadline is 1,000 ms. In the HiSlow condition, the CSD is longer, and errors of commission are much more likely (around 50%). In the HiFast condition, the same CSD is used as in the low condition, but the response deadline is shortened to force errors in which the response is not generated before the deadline. The deadline is manipulated to force tardy errors in 50% of Change signal trials (Brown & Braver, 2005) . For the present study, the Change signal task was modiWed to diVerentially manipulate the likelihood of two diVerent kinds of errors: premature errors as in previous work (Brown & Braver, 2005) , and tardy errors (Fig. 1b) . In a control condition (Low), the error rate is maintained at a low level. In the High Slow condition, premature errors occur when responses to the Wrst arrow are generated despite the appearance of a Change signal (second arrow). In the High Fast condition, error likelihood is manipulated by shortening the response deadline. This leads to tardy errors as subjects fail to respond before the response deadline. Of note, error rates in the High Fast and High Slow conditions are maintained at the same level. In other words, the error likelihoods are controlled, but the kinds of errors (tardy vs. premature) are diVerent. The rationale for these manipulations is that the appropriate control strategies are opposite: to be successful, subjects must try to respond more quickly in the High/Fast condition but more slowly in the High/Slow condition.
The hypotheses to be explored here are: (1) that an increased error likelihood resulting from tardy responses will yield distinct control eVects in subsequent trials, namely that subsequent responses will be faster regardless of subsequent trial conditions; (2) that an increased error likelihood due to premature responses will lead to slower responses in subsequent trials; and (3) that these eVects of error likelihood will be distinct from the control eVects induced by response conXict. Evidence consistent with these hypotheses will advance understanding of the richness and speciWcity of cognitive control signals.
Materials and methods
With informed consent, subjects (n = 21, 11 female, mean age 24, range 18-41) performed a Fast/Slow Change signal task (Brown & Braver, 2005 as follows. All procedures were approved by the Indiana University Human Subjects Committee. Subjects were seated in front of a CRT computer screen and performed six blocks of 150 trials of the task. Stimuli were presented in the center of a black screen. Each trial began as a cue of colored dashes "-" was presented for 1,000 ms. There were three error likelihood conditions (described below): Low error likelihood, High Fast error likelihood, and High Slow error likelihood. The color of the dashes was paired with the error likelihood condition. Cue colors were blue (RGB 128, 128, 255), yellow (255, 255, 0) , and white (255, 255, 255) , and the pairings of cue color with error likelihood and likely error type were counterbalanced across subjects. Subsequent to the cue, arrows were formed by adding a greater-than or lessthan symbol to the end of the dashes, as in "-->" in courier font. The Cue and Go signals were presented in 18 point font, and the Change signal (if it appeared) was presented directly above the Go signal in 36 point font. The Change signal consists of two dashes and a greater-or less-than symbol forming an arrow pointing in the opposite direction from the Wrst arrow (Go signal). The appearance of the second arrow (the Change signal) countermanding the Wrst satisWes the deWnition of stimuli that elicit response conXict. For the Low error likelihood condition, the response deadline was 1,000 ms after the onset of the Wrst arrow. The CSD for the Low condition was initialized at 250 ms and adjusted with an asymmetric staircase algorithm to maintain a target rate of 5% errors. For the High Slow condition, the CSD was initialized at 400 ms and adjusted to maintain a target rate of 50% errors. For the High Fast condition, the CSD was the same as the Low condition, but the response deadline was initialized at 750 ms and adjusted to maintain a target rate of 50% errors, i.e., tardy errors consisting of a failure to respond before the response deadline. Immediately after the response deadline, feedback was presented onscreen to the subject until 1,500 ms had elapsed since the onset of the Wrst arrow. Feedback consists of the words "Correct", "Error" (in the case of premature responses), or "Faster" (in the case of tardy or missing responses) presented in the center of the screen, in the same font color as the error likelihood color cue for that trial. Each trial ends with a black screen for 500 ms. Thus, each trial lasts 3,000 ms. Two-thirds of the trials were Go trials, in which only a single arrow appeared. The remaining one-third of trials were Change trials, in which the second arrow appeared. The High Fast, High Slow, and Low error likelihood conditions were presented with equal probability, randomly, and with replacement from trial to trial. To summarize the task conditions, the factors of error likelihood (Low, High Fast, and High Slow) were fully crossed with the factor of Go versus Change. The response outcomes for each trial could be correct, premature response errors (errors of commission), or tardy errors (no response trials).
At the beginning of each session, subjects were instructed how to do the task and given a small number of practice trials to ensure that they understood the task and were able to perform it. Practice trials ended as soon as it was clear that the subject understood the task instructions and was able to perform the task. Subjects were not informed about the meaning of the cue colors in terms of their association with diVerent error likelihoods. Thus, all error likelihood eVects in Go trials are the result of learning from experience.
Results

Error likelihood manipulation
The Wrst analysis conWrmed the validity of the error likelihood manipulation (Fig. 2a) . In the Change conditions, the average error rates for High Fast and High Slow were 47.5 and 52.2%, respectively, which is close to the target of 50% errors. The error rate for Low trials was 10%, which is close to the 5% target and well below the 50% error rate target for High error likelihood conditions. Of these errors, tardy errors (i.e., no response or response too late) constituted 33.8% of High Fast Change trials, 1.03% of High Slow Change trials, and less-than 0.1% of Low Change trials. Thus, the majority of errors in the High Fast condition were tardy errors, while errors in the other conditions consisted almost exclusively of premature responses. Of note, in the High Fast Go (i.e., no Change signal) condition, the response deadline forced an average tardy error rate of 19.5%, further contributing to the overall majority of tardy rather than premature errors in the High Fast condition.
Current trial RT eVects
Given inconsistent prior results of error likelihood eVects on response time (Brown & Braver, 2005 , a foundational question is whether error likelihood manipulations yield response time eVects. Analysis of current correct trial eVects on response time (Fig. 2b) revealed a main eVect of error likelihood condition (High/Fast, High/Slow, and Low/ Slow), F(2, 40, MSe = 2,337) = 26.32, P < 0.0001. There was a main eVect of Go versus Change, F(1, 20, MSe = 1,308) = 144.55, P < 0.0001. The error likelihood eVects were not limited to Change trials. When the analysis was restricted to correct Go trials with the three error likelihood conditions, the eVects of error likelihood remained, F(2, 40, MSe = 1,234) = 11.08, P < 0.0002. Further tests with correct, Go trials revealed a trend toward slower response times for High Slow versus Low conditions, F(1, 20, MSe = 737) = 3.95, P = 0.06. Response times were faster in the High Fast condition versus the Low condition, F(1, 20, MSe = 610) = 19.29, P < 0.0003. The fact that response times are faster the High Fast condition may be due to anticipation of tardy errors as driven by the associated color cue, but it may also be due to a truncation of the response time distribution by the earlier response deadline. The latter possibility is suggested by the higher percentage of tardy errors in the High Fast conditions, for both Go and Change trials (Fig. 2a) . The analyses of previous trial RT eVects below will demonstrate that the High Fast trial eVects are consistent with a control signal driven by anticipated tardy errors. Overall, both error likelihood and conXict (Change vs. Go condition) manipulations led to response time eVects in the current trial.
Previous trial RT eVects
Cognitive control eVects are seen most clearly in how a preceding trial condition inXuences current trial RT (Botvinick et al., 2001; Jones et al., 2002) . If error likelihood eVects lead to changes in cognitive control consistent with avoiding the potential error, then a higher likelihood of tardy errors should lead to faster responses in subsequent trials (Fig. 3a, b) . Likewise, a higher likelihood of premature response errors should lead to slower responses in subsequent trials. Furthermore, if conXict eVects are in fact , conXict) to a given error likelihood condition (relative to the Go condition) might be expected to increase the perceived error likelihood and therefore amplify the subsequent trial control eVect exerted in response to that error likelihood condition (Fig. 3b) . Alternatively, if control eVects due to conXict are distinct and separate from those due to error likelihood, then no interaction between conXict and error likelihood eVects would be predicted in subsequent correct, Go trials (Fig. 3a) .
To explore the question of these competing hypotheses, the response times were submitted to a full factorial analysis using factors of current and previous trial error likelihood conditions, looking only at conditions in which the current and previous trial responses were correct, Go trials (Fig. 3c) . For current correct Go trials, in which the previous trial was also a Go trial, the percentage of trials remaining after selecting for previous correct trials was consistent with Fig. 2a: 80 .3% of previous High Fast trials, 97.5% of previous High Slow trials, and 98.2% of previous Low trials had correct previous trial responses. Analysis of these trials showed that in addition to the main eVect of current error likelihood condition [F(2, 40, MSe = 3,809) = 7.36, P < 0.002], there was also a main eVect of previous trial error likelihood condition [F(2, 40, MSe = 289) = 25.16, P < 0.0001], as well as a slight interaction between current and previous error likelihood conditions [F(4, 80 , MSe = 220.7) = 2.95, P < 0.03]. Further analysis of the previous error likelihood condition eVects (Fig. 3c, d It must be emphasized that the eVects of speeding and slowing were carried over into subsequent trials, a Wnding that is consistent with the hypothesis of two distinct cognitive control eVects, one that speeds up responses given a likelihood of errors due to shorter response deadlines, and one that slows down responses given a likelihood of errors due to premature responses. Also, it is not clear how the present results could be accommodated by a priming based account (Mayr, Awh, & Laurey, 2003) : the results show distinct eVects of both speeding up and slowing down responses in subsequent trials, even when restricting the analysis to trials without conXict (Change signals).
The results of previous trial eVects (Fig. 3d ) discriminate between the two competing hypotheses of Figure 3a These results are consistent with the hypothesis of independent control mechanisms driven separately by conXict and error likelihood (Fig. 3a) , but they are inconsistent with the hypothesis that conXict eVects amplify error likelihood eVects (Fig. 3b) . . There was also a small interaction such that previous tardy errors versus correct led to less conXictinduced slowing [F(1, 20 , MSe = 527) = 4.64, P < 0.05]. These Wndings are notable for several reasons. First, they suggest a multiplicity of error-driven control signals, namely that tardy errors speciWcally can lead to speeding up as well as the slowing down eVects reported (Laming, 1968) and simulated (Botvinick et al., 2001; Jones et al., 2002) previously. Second, they show that conXict versus errors can under certain circumstances lead to distinct or even competing control eVects. This suggests that theories of error signals as a reXection of underlying conXict detection (Carter et al., 1998) 
Practice eVects
Previous studies of the Change signal task showed evidence consistent with learning of the error likelihood eVects across an experimental session, even though the eVects did not reach signiWcance (Brown & Braver, 2005) . The current study yielded similar results. To test for practice eVects, each session was divided into sets of the Wrst three blocks versus the last three blocks, and the response times were analyzed for current correct trials. An ANOVA was performed on error likelihood condition (High Fast, High Slow, Low) by conXict (Go, Change) and by time (Wrst three vs. last three blocks), with subject as the random factor. The results showed a main eVect of time [F(1, 20 , MSe = 10,413) = 14.07, P < 0.002], such that response time was faster in later blocks (466 ms) versus earlier blocks (514 ms). There was also an interaction of time by conXict [F(1, 20, MSe = 565) = 7.85, P < 0.02], such that the conXict eVect was smaller in the later blocks (69 ms) versus the earlier blocks (86 ms). There was no signiWcant interaction of time by error likelihood condition [F(2, 40, MSe = 693) = 0.53, P = 0.59] for current trial response time, indicating that the error likelihood eVects were already established relatively early in the session, possibly during the practice trials.
Discussion
The results of eVects of previous trial conditions are consistent with multiple distinct cognitive control eVects. The hypothesis that increased error likelihood of tardy responses will lead to speeding up in subsequent trials was conWrmed, as was the hypothesis that increased error likelihood of premature responses will lead to slowing in subsequent trials. Critically, the results are also consistent with the third hypothesis, that cognitive control eVects due to conXict versus error likelihood are distinct. The results thus suggest that conXict monitoring and error likelihood monitoring by ACC may constitute at least partly distinct processes.
The results are consistent with the existence of three separate cognitive control mechanisms, each of which is adaptive in the task context. First, an increased likelihood of premature response errors, even in the absence of response conXict, leads to a general slowing of responses in subsequent trials. This is adaptive as slower responses in general may reduce the likelihood of premature errors on Change trials. Second, an increased likelihood of tardy response errors leads to a general speeding of responses in subsequent trials. This is also adaptive, as faster responses may help avoid failures to respond in time. It should be noted that although the results are consistent with distinct monitoring/control mechanisms, it is also possible that the monitoring mechanisms responsible for speeding up versus slowing down may drive a single Wnal common control pathway, albeit in opposite directions.
Third, conXict leads to a general slowing of subsequent trial responses. This is an appropriate response, because whenever there is a Change signal, slower responses may allow more time to respond eVectively to a delayed Change signal. In that regard, the results are consistent with conXict as reXecting a likelihood of premature response errors, leading to a general slowing eVect (Botvinick et al., 2001; Jones et al., 2002) . Of note, the results do not discriminate whether the conXict eVect reXects an actual conXict computation per se or instead an underlying prediction of error likelihood; the results simply show that Change signals lead to subsequent trial slowing, which is a response consistent with reducing the likelihood of errors in the event that more Change signals appear in future trials.
The present results diVer from earlier studies of the Change signal task, in which response time eVects were not consistently found (Brown & Braver, 2005 . Several factors may account for the diVerences. First, the present study used shorter inter-trial intervals (ITI) than the previous studies. Longer ITIs were necessary in previous studies due to the importance of varying inter-trial intervals in eventrelated fMRI (Dale, 1999) . Correspondingly, the mean RTs are shorter in this study relative to the previous studies. It may be that with longer ITIs, RTs show a ceiling eVect near the response deadline as subjects focus on accuracy over speed in order to maximize the rate of correct trials per unit time (Bogacz, Brown, Moehlis, Holmes, & Cohen, 2006) .
The issue of multiple cognitive control signals is not universally appreciated in previous work. Existing studies cast ACC activity as generally slowing responses (Botvinick et al., 2001; Brown & Braver, 2005; Jones et al., 2002) , increasing attentional focus (Botvinick et al., 2001; Posner & DiGirolamo, 1998) , or increasing learning rates (Behrens et al., 2007) . A model of multiple interacting control signals in task switching has recently been proposed .
As a whole, the results point to the existence of multiple, distinct cognitive control mechanisms that contribute to RT eVects across sequences of trials. The lack of interaction between conXict and error likelihood eVects on subsequent trial RT points to the existence of at least partly distinct cognitive control mechanisms that detect conXict versus error likelihood. These results contribute to a growing body of literature suggesting multiple distinct cognitive control eVects driven by ACC and challenge existing models of cognitive control.
